Interpretive inquiry-especially as it is practiced in some fields of social science research-has been an accepted form of serious inquiry for a far shorter time than it has been for other social sciences (for instance, anthropology and sociology). Consequently, as its acceptance has been debated, it has been involved in intense cross-disciplinary discussions of what constitutes its quality criteria. I prefer to think of this issue of quality as a dialogue about emerging criteria. I label this discussion that way because I believe that the entire field of interpretive or qualitative inquiry is itself still emerging and being defined. There are far fewer fixed regulations in the discourse of interpretive scholarship than there are in more conventional forms of inquiry.
In the midst of this ongoing discussion, however, some scholars are arguing that interpretive research traditions have already moved beyond discussions of firm, fixed, or consensually derived criteria, which are declared foundational (or, at best, nonfoundational). As Smith (1993) (p. 153) . These scholars have adopted a posture that is &dquo;antifoundational,&dquo; that is, they argue that it has moved beyond, or stepped to the side of, rigid dualisms that characterize both empiricist and postempiricist inquiry (e.g., subject-object, true-false, objective-subjective; see, e.g., Smith, 1993, and Schwandt, 1995 Schwandt's (1995) call for practical rationality is (as an antidote to the epistemologic project of foundationalism), such community deliberation about rightness is not likely to prevail anytime soon. In fact, community deliberation about rightness-the exercise of practical rationality itself-suggests (as does Schwandt) that it has a &dquo;rhetorical&dquo; and &dquo;persuasive&dquo; (Smith, 1993, p. (Guba & Lincoln,1982) under the title &dquo;Epistemological and Methodological Bases of Naturalistic Inquiry&dquo; Those guidelines essentially proposed a set of criteria, which resembled the four that guided conventional inquiry (see Columns 1 and 2, (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) . These new criteria were highly reflective of the commitment of inquiry to fairness (balance of stakeholder views), to the learning of respondents as much as to the learning of the researcher, to the open and democratic sharing of knowledge rather than the concentration of inquiry knowledge in the hands of a privileged elite, and to the fostering, stimulation, and enabling of social action (see Column 3, Table 1 ; Guba & Lincoln, 1989 (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Reason, 1993; Schwandt, 1995; Smith, 1993 scholarly work, would almost surely assent to these criteria. Nevertheless, they are one attempt to provide additional clarity with respect to the disciplined nature of such work. The criteria proposed relate almost solely to the inquiry community (that is, to the knowledge production end of the research enterprise), but they are useful because they suggest how qualitative researchers have gone about answering the criticisms of the conventional community.
The statement of standards that Elliott and his colleagues (1994) developed have another weakness, however; this one is grounded in the &dquo;conceptual practices of power&dquo; (Schwandt, 1995) . They are highly responsive to a situation described by Smith (1993, pp. 156-157) (Haraway,1989; hooks, 1990 Community as Arbiter of Quality
The next set of criteria that are emerging as quality-cum-ethical criteria are a set I would group under the rubric of community. Although we might quibble about my name for this category, this particular set of standards does indeed reference the communitarian nature of research as it is reconceived in new-paradigm work. I label it communitarian because it recognizes that research takes place in, and is addressed to, a community; it is also accurately labeled because of the desire of those who discuss such research to have it serve the purposes of the community in which it was carried out, rather than simply serving the community of knowledge producers and policymakers. That is to say, it has much broader implications and uses than those to which most research has been directed in the near and far past. Among the scholars and theorists who are exploring community, I would nominate Palmer (1987) and Savage (1988) . Palmer (1987) (Palmer, 1987, p. (Palmer, 1987, p. 24 (Lincoln, 1987) Critical Subjectivity Yet another criterion is reflexivity, or critical subjectivity. Subjectivity goes under many names: critical subjectivity (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) , transformative subjectivity (Frieden, 1989) , and critical reflexivity. Although there is no general agreement on what the various forms of subjectivities or reflexivities might be, I will attempt to talk around the concept for the purposes of this work. Critical subjectivity or reflexivity is the ability to enter an altered state of consciousness (Heron, 1981; Rowan, 1981, p. 169) or &dquo;high-quality awareness&dquo; (Reason & Rowan, 1981b) 
Reciprocity
Reciprocity is a term I first encountered in the works of both Rowan (1981) and Reinharz (1979) . Reciprocity as a characteristic of high-quality, rigorous qualitative interpretive inquiry is argued to be essential because of the person-centered nature of interpretive work. Rowan (1981) [167] [168] McLaughlin and Tierney (1993) (1981) both deal specifically with the relationship between feminism as an inquiry model and ethical and ecological concerns, or concern for the physical environment and its resources. Berry (1988) links not feminism, but rather emerging models and paradigms of science to ecological concerns in a way that recognizes and honors the ecological as well as the human. His concern is that in the destruction of the physical environment are the seeds for the destruction of the human spirit. Only by recapturing the sense of sacredness about that which nourishes and sustains us can we learn how both to inquire sanely and to live in peace.
This theme has been elaborated recently by Reason (1993) , who argues that science has a sacred and spiritual character. The spiritual, or sacred, side of science emerges from a profound concern for human dignity, justice, and interpersonal respect. The sacredness in the enterprise of science issues from the collaborative and egalitarian aspects of the relationships created in the research-to-action continuum. Researchers who conceive of science in this way make space for the lifeways of others and create relationships that are based not on unequal power, but on mutual respect, granting of dignity, and deep appreciation of the human condition.
Sharing the Perquisites of Privilege Brown (1993) , in a recent &dquo;Point of View&dquo; piece in the Chronicle of Higher Education, makes a rather stunning admission when she says that she and her research respondent, &dquo;Mama Lola&dquo; (see Brown, 1992) , both share in the royalties of the book whose life Mama Lola lives and whose life Brown chronicled in her eponymous book. Brown shares with her readers that when Mama Lola runs short of money, Brown contributes to the mortgage payment. Lather (1995) (Lincoln, 1994, in The third idea to which I would like to draw attention is that all, or virtually all, of these criteria are relational. Reason and Rowan (1981b) (Lincoln & Guba, 1989 
